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Ideally, ﬁrms should discontinue projects that become unproﬁtable. Managers,
however, continue to operate such projects because of their limited employ-
ment horizons and empire-building motivations (Jensen, 1986; Ball, 2001).
Prior studies suggest that timely loss recognition in accounting earnings
enables lenders, shareholders, and boards of directors to identify unproﬁtable
projects; thereby, enabling them to force managers to discontinue such projects
before large value erosion occurs. However, this conjecture has not been tested
empirically. Consistent with this notion, we ﬁnd that timely loss recognition
increases the likelihood of timely closures of unproﬁtable projects. Moreover,
managers, by announcing late discontinuations of such projects, reveal their
inability to select good projects and/or to contain losses, when projects turn
unproﬁtable. Accordingly, thereafter, the fund providers and board of direc-
tors are likely to demand improved timeliness of loss recognition and stringent
scrutiny of ﬁrms’ capital expenditure plans. Consistently, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms
that announce large discontinuation losses reduce capital expenditures and
improve timeliness of loss recognition in subsequent years. Our study provides
evidence that timely loss reporting aﬀects “real” economic decisions and cre-
ates economic beneﬁts.
 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Yat-sen
es. Tel.:
@mays.
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It is inevitable that some capital expenditure projects that ﬁrms undertake would later turn out to be
unproﬁtable.3 Investors would prefer that managers terminate such projects once their losses become appar-
ent. However, managers may ineﬃciently continue to operate unproﬁtable projects, thereby magnifying ﬁrms’
economic losses, rather than terminating them in a timely manner (e.g., Ball, 2001). This behavior stems from
managers’ limited employment horizons, empire building tendencies, overconﬁdence, aversion to reporting
losses, and the fear of loss of reputation, remuneration, and employment. Prior studies suggest that timely loss
recognition in accounting earnings should enable lenders, shareholders, and boards of directors (hereafter
referred to as the “principals”) to identify unproﬁtable projects in a timely manner, thus, enabling them to
force managers to discontinue such projects before large value erosion (e.g., Ball, 2001; Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005; Watts, 2003; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). In this study, we examine whether timely
reporting of losses results in timely termination of unproﬁtable projects, a question that remains unexamined.
In a related study, Ahmed and Duellman (2007, 2011) examine determinants of ﬁrms’ project selection.
They examine whether ﬁrms that recognize losses in a timely manner make good investment decisions.
Similarly, Francis and Martin (2010) examine whether timely loss recognizers undertake proﬁtable, and hence
longer-lived, acquisitions. In addition, they examine whether timely loss recognizers divest acquired companies
in a timely manner. Neither study examines companies’ ex-post termination of unproﬁtable projects, how-
ever.4 Firms are likely to initiate and terminate projects more frequently than they acquire and sell other com-
panies. Thus we focus on the decision to discontinue operations since these are likely to represent a more
complete picture of managers’ investment decisions that turn unproﬁtable. Discontinued operations reported
in the ﬁnancial statements are important by deﬁnition since they are material. Decisions related to such pro-
jects create signiﬁcant agency conﬂicts because their continuation, on the one hand, increases losses for lenders
and shareholders, but on the other hand, may beneﬁt managers. Accordingly, our study examines whether
timely loss recognition reduces agency conﬂicts in the decision to discontinue operations.
We assume that managers are averse to discontinuing any projects, and therefore only terminate unprof-
itable projects.5We conjecture that ﬁrms with timely loss recognition are more likely to terminate unproﬁtable
projects. Therefore, we ﬁrst examine whether project discontinuations are positively associated with timely
reporting of losses in the three-year period preceding the discontinuations. Consistent with prior studies
(e.g. Francis and Martin, 2010), we use a matched-pair design. We identify a control group of ﬁrms that have
similar investment opportunities and face similar economic shocks (that make projects unproﬁtable) as the
sample discontinuation ﬁrms. The control group ﬁrms do not announce termination of unproﬁtable projects
in the sample ﬁrm’s discontinuation year or in the preceding three years. Accordingly, we examine whether
sample ﬁrms that announce termination of projects have more eﬀective timely loss recognition in the three
preceding years than the control group.
We need a ﬁrm-year speciﬁc measure of timeliness of loss recognition to examine our research questions.
We do not use measures that require multiple years’ data for calculation (for example, Basu (1997) and
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) measures) because we assume that ﬁrm characteristics can change over time.
Accordingly, we use two state-of-the art measures of the timeliness of loss recognition at the ﬁrm-year level.
Following Francis and Martin (2010), we use CSCORE (Khan and Watts, 2009).6 We also report results for3 In this study, the notion of project “unproﬁtability” includes instances of (1) current losses; (2) negative present value of future cash
ﬂows; or (3) liquidation value exceeding present value of future cash ﬂows. Such instances reduce ﬁrm value.
4 Tan (2013) examines actions lenders initiate after debt covenant violation, resulting in more conservative investment decisions and
ﬁnancial reporting. Biddle et al. (2013) examine changes in ﬁnancial reporting following increased bankruptcy risk.
5 Bunsis (1997) and Jaggi et al. (2009) ﬁnd evidence that shareholders react positively to asset write-downs that involve closing of an
unproﬁtable plant or division.
6 CSCORE is derived from Basu’s (1997) notion of asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition and is a ﬁrm-year speciﬁc measure of
conditional conservatism. Firm-year values of CSCORE can be calculated from cross-sectional returns and earnings data for one year.
Similar to Basu’s measure, CSCORE is calculated from earnings-return coeﬃcients for ﬁrms with positive or negative returns. For our
tests, we use the negative-return coeﬃcient (rather than the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients for negative and positive returns) because we
are interested in measuring cross-sectional variation in the timeliness of loss recognition. Khan and Watts (2009) label this measure “bad
news timeliness” and obtain it by summing CSCORE (diﬀerence between timeliness of bad versus good news recognition) and GSCORE
(timeliness of good news recognition).
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uation ﬁrms have higher CSCORE in the three preceding years than the control group.
Our ﬁrst test above provides preliminary evidence that timely-loss-recognition is positively associated with
closures of projects. However, this test ignores the possibility that loss severity may be related to the timeliness
of discontinuations. We expect late discontinuations of unproﬁtable projects to result in higher economic
losses than timelier discontinuations. Accordingly, we measure timeliness of project closures by the magnitude
of asset-deﬂated losses announced on discontinuation.8 Moreover, we expect that ﬁrms with late discontinu-
ations have less eﬀective timely loss reporting than those with timely discontinuations. We test this hypothesis
by performing three tests using three proxies of late discontinuations. In our ﬁrst test, we ﬁnd that the mag-
nitude of discontinuation losses is negatively associated with the CSCORE. In our second test, we divide our
sample ﬁrms into small discontinuation loss and large discontinuation loss categories using a loss cutoﬀ of 1%
of beginning-of-year assets. The separation helps us to test whether loss projects are discontinued in a timelier
manner. We assume that the magnitude of the loss for most timely discontinuances is going to be smaller. We
ﬁnd that large discontinuation losses occur less frequently as CSCORE increases. We further partition the
sample into four ordered categories comprised of ﬁrms with asset-deﬂated discontinuation losses smaller than
1%, and ﬁrms with losses of 1% to 3%, 3% to 5%, and greater than 5%. We ﬁnd that the likelihood that a ﬁrm
falls into a higher loss category is negatively associated with CSCORE. Jointly these results suggest that timely
loss recognition not only increases the likelihood of termination of unproﬁtable projects, but it also increases
the likelihood that such projects are discontinued in a timelier manner.
Managers of ﬁrms that announce large losses on discontinuations signal that they failed to discontinue
unproﬁtable projects in a timely manner. In other words, they signal their inability to select proﬁtable projects
and/or to stop value erosion when projects turn unproﬁtable. After such announcements, we expect investors
to demand timelier reporting of losses to prevent those managers from continuing to operate other unprof-
itable projects.9 Accordingly, we expect late discontinuations to be followed subsequently by improvement
in timeliness of loss recognition. We test this hypothesis by measuring CSCORE two years before and after
ﬁrms report large discontinuations. We ﬁnd that the changes in CSCORE are higher for late discontinuation
ﬁrms than for control ﬁrms (i.e. those with no discontinuances) and timely discontinuations ﬁrms. Moreover,
unless investors can force a change in management,10 they are likely to more stringently scrutinize proposed
projects or restrain those managers from further implementing large capital expenditure plans. Consistent with
this conjecture, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decline in capital expenditures by late discontinuation ﬁrms relative to
control ﬁrms and ﬁrms with timely discontinuations.
Overall, our study provides evidence that the likelihood of ﬁrms’ discontinuing unproﬁtable projects in a
timely manner increases with timely loss recognition. Our study provides evidence on the extent to which
timely loss reporting aﬀects “real” economic decisions, and whether accounting conservatism provides eco-
nomic beneﬁts to investors (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Basu, 1997; Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003; Ball
and Shivakumar, 2005). In particular, our study complements prior studies that claim that accounting conser-
vatism can improve investment eﬃciency (e.g., Ball, 2001; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Biddle and Hillary,
2006). We also extend studies that examine accounting conservatism as a corporate governance mechanism
(e.g., Watts, 2003; Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007, 2011). The rest of the paper proceeds
as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample, the research design, and the
results. Section 4 describes supplementary tests to examine validity of our empirical measures, and
Section 5 concludes.7 We use CSCORE as our primary measure because Francis and Martin (2010) use this measure to address questions that are closely
related to ours. In addition, CSCORE requires less restrictive sampling procedure, preserving almost four times as many discontinuation
observations for our tests as the Conservatism Ratio.
8 Bunsis (1997), Heﬂin and Warﬁeld (1997), and Elliott and Shaw (1988) ﬁnd that the short-term return surrounding asset write-downs is
negatively associated with the magnitude of write-downs. Heﬂin and Warﬁeld (1997) conclude that ﬁrms with large write-downs delay
their decisions by as much as three years.
9 The late termination of unproﬁtable projects may indicate that the ﬁrm’s accounting system does not provide timely information about
losses. Auditors and boards of directors may respond by advocating and supporting for more timely loss recognition.
10 Conyon and Florou (2002) ﬁnd that corporate performance must fall drastically to force dismissal of senior executives.
150 A. Srivastava et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 147–1672. Development of hypothesis
Some projects that managers initiate subsequently turn out to be unproﬁtable. Managers receive informa-
tion on changes in expected cash ﬂows from a project before external investors. Closing such unproﬁtable pro-
jects should cut ﬁrms’ economic losses. However, managers continue to operate unproﬁtable projects because
closing them may lead to reporting of one-time losses which might reduce their wealth via bonus, and lower
their employment prospects through retention, promotion or alternative employment (Ball, 2001). Thus, man-
agers delay closures, thus gradually incorporating reduced cash ﬂows in earnings, even though doing so mag-
niﬁes losses to lenders and shareholders. Similarly, Baumol (1967) and Jensen (1986) suggest that managers
build empires rather than abandon unproﬁtable projects. Therefore, accounting regimes that force prompt
loss recognition (that is, within managers’ performance assessment periods) are likely to reduce managers’
incentives to continue running unproﬁtable projects (e.g. Watts, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Other
studies argue that timely recognition of losses improves corporate governance (e.g., Watts, 2003; Beekes
et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007, 2011), reduces agency conﬂicts (e.g. LaFond and Roychowdhury,
2008), and improves investment eﬃciency (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Biddle and Hillary, 2006).
We assume that managers prefer to continue operating all projects, only terminating unproﬁtable projects.
Accordingly, we examine whether ﬁrms that promptly recognize economic losses in accounting earnings are
more likely to terminate projects. This discussion leads us to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1. Timely loss recognition increases the likelihood of project terminations.
Not all terminations of projects are likely to be timely. Some projects might only be terminated after pro-
ducing losses that are too large to ignore or that become signiﬁcant drains on ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows. Firms that do
not recognize losses in a timely manner are more likely to have “late” terminations. Accordingly, we hypoth-
esize the following:
H2. Timely loss recognition reduces the likelihood of late termination of unproﬁtable projects.
Managers of ﬁrms that announce late termination of unproﬁtable projects reveal their inability to select
good projects and/or to contain economic losses when external events make projects unproﬁtable. The inves-
tors in ﬁrms with late terminations are likely to demand improvement in accounting information systems,
speciﬁcally, to increase the timeliness of the reporting of economic losses, in order to prevent late discontin-
uations in future. Furthermore, unless investors can force for a change in the management team, they are
likely to impose stringent project selection criteria or restrain managers from implementing large capital
expenditure projects. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H3a. Late termination of unproﬁtable projects is followed by improved timely loss recognition; and
H3b. Late termination of unproﬁtable projects is followed by reduced capital expenditure.3. Sample selection, research design, and results
3.1. Sample selection
We describe sample selection procedure in Table 1. We classify all non-zero gains or losses from discontin-
ued operations (Compustat item “DO”) as discontinuation events. The “DO” data ﬁeld contains the sum of
(1) total income or loss from operations of a discontinued division and (2) the gain or loss on the disposal of
that division. Compustat does not separately report data on those two categories of losses. We use this sum as
an indicator of the unproﬁtability of the project because it provides an estimate of investors’ total loss on the
project discontinuation. In a later section, we examine the relation between DO and its components using
hand collected data. Compustat has 25,668 ﬁrm-year observations (representing 8841 distinct ﬁrms) with
non-zero entry in the “DO” ﬁeld in the period 1968–2007.
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tinuations are likely to result in smaller losses than late discontinuations. We classify discontinuation losses of
less than 1% of the ﬁrm’s beginning-of-year assets as “timely” discontinuations and the others as “late”. We
deﬂate discontinuation losses by the ﬁrm’s assets to measure the signiﬁcance of discontinued operations to the
ﬁrm. An alternative measure based on the ratio of the discontinuation losses to the assets of the discontinued
operations may provide better assessment of the proﬁtability of the discontinued operations; however, asset
values of the discontinued operations are not available in the Compustat database. We test the consistency
between measures derived using those two asset deﬂators (that is, the value of total assets and the value of
discontinued assets) using hand-collected data in a later section.
We hypothesize that ﬁrms with eﬀective timely-loss-recognition governance report timely discontinuations
while those with less eﬀective governance report late discontinuations. Therefore, we measure timeliness of
loss reporting in the three years prior to the reported discontinuations and require that sample ﬁrms not
report any discontinuation during those three years. We use CSCORE (Khan and Watts, 2009) as our pri-
mary ﬁrm-year measure of timely loss recognition. Thus, we require that sample ﬁrms have data in
Compustat to calculate CSCORE (we describe estimation procedure in Appendix A) during those three
prior years. These requirements leave us with 3618 ﬁrm-year observations (representing 2949 distinct ﬁrms)
in our sample.
3.2. Research design: Control ﬁrms matched on industry, size, and time
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Francis and Martin, 2010), we use a matched-pair design to test our
hypotheses.11 In order to examine the association of timely-loss-recognition-governance and project closures,
we compare our sample ﬁrms to a group of “matched” ﬁrms that face similar investment opportunities and
economic shocks as sample ﬁrms, but that do not report discontinuations.
As Fig. 1 illustrates, we match sample and control ﬁrms by industry and the book value of assets
(Compustat item “AT”) four years prior to the sample ﬁrm’s report of discontinuations. Zucca and
Campbell (1992) and Strong and Meyer (1987) also use a control group matched on industry and assets size
to examine characteristics of ﬁrms that write down assets. We require that matched “control” ﬁrms do not
report any discontinuations in the sample ﬁrms’ discontinuation years or in the three prior years.
Moreover, they should have data in Compustat to calculate CSCORE for those prior years. Of the 3618 dis-
continuation events above, we are able to ﬁnd a match for 3523 (97.4%) ﬁrm years in the same three-digit SIC
code industry and 78 (2.2%) in the same two-digit SIC code industry. This leaves us with 3601 sample
ﬁrm-year observations for 2949 distinct ﬁrms.
In a later sub-section, we summarize the calculation of Conservatism Ratio (Callen et al., 2010), the related
sample selection procedure, and our results for this measure. We use CSCORE as our primary measure
because Francis and Martin (2010) use it in a similar study, and also because this measure imposes less restric-
tive sampling constraints, yielding almost four times as many observations as the Conservatism Ratio (3601
versus 997 observations).
3.3. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests
We present descriptive statistics for discontinuation ﬁrms in Table 1. Panel B shows that more than 80% of
our sample ﬁrms report discontinuations only once. The remaining 20% ﬁrms report up to ﬁve discontinua-
tions (reported by ﬁve ﬁrms) during the study period. Panel C shows that discontinuation ﬁrms are widely
distributed across industry categories and no single industry category dominates. Nevertheless, the industry
categories with the most frequent late discontinuations are Personal and Business Services, Business11 An alternative to this ex-post matched-pair design is to use a multivariate prediction model of discontinuations using all ﬁrms’ data to
examine whether lower CSCORE is associated with the likelihood of discontinuations. However, because discontinuations are relatively
infrequent (occurring in fewer than 10% of all ﬁrm-years in the Compustat database) such a prediction model is likely to be noisy and to
result in numerous false-positive errors.
Table 1
Sample derivation and distribution.
Distinct ﬁrms Firm-years
Panel A: Sample selection (H1a and H1b)
Firm years in Compustat with non-zero assets (all years up to 2007) 28,330 364,792
Of the above, ﬁrms that report discontinuations 8841 25,668
Of the above, ﬁrms that report discontinuations, but do not report discontinuations in the previous three years, and have data to calculate
CSCORE in the three years prior to discontinuations
2949 3618
Of the above, ﬁrms that have matched ﬁrms in control group (ﬁrms that do not report any discontinuations, are in similar industry as in sample
ﬁrms, are closest in asset size four years prior to sample ﬁrm’s reported discontinuation years, and have data to calculate CSCORE in the prior
three years)
2938 3601
Frequency Number of distinct ﬁrms
Panel B: Frequency of discontinuations by ﬁrms
1 2409
2 422
3 85
4 17
5 5
Fama French industry number Industry name Frequency of discontinuations
Panel C: Distribution of discontinuations by industry
1 Food Products 130
3 Tobacco Products 7
4 Recreation 101
5 Printing and Publishing 112
6 Consumer Goods 112
7 Apparel 63
8 Healthcare and Medical Equipment 264
9 Chemicals 99
10 Textiles 45
11 Construction and Construction 218
12 Steel Works Etc 86
13 Fabricated Products and Machinery 189
14 Electrical Equipment 140
15 Automobiles and Trucks 81
16 Aircraft, Ships, and railroad 46
17 Precious Metals, Non-Metallic 50
18 Coal 7
19 Petroleum and Natural Gas 159
20 Utilities 161
Line missing
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Figure 1a. Sample and control ﬁrms.
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Figure 1b. Change in ﬁrm characteristics upon reporting of late discontinuations.
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A. Srivastava et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 147–167 1551990s, and large increases after 1995 and 2001, i.e., at about the time SFAS 121 (FASB, 1995) and SFAS 144
(FASB, 2001) respectively, became eﬀective.12
Table 2 Panel A provides descriptive statistics of sample and control ﬁrms in the match year. The average
size (total assets), market to book value ratio [measured as market value of equity {Price
(PRCC_F)  Number of shares outstanding (CSHO)} divided by book value of equity (CEQ)], net proﬁts
(IB), capital expenditures (CAPX), and capital expenditure to total assets ratio are not statistically diﬀerent
for control and sample ﬁrms. This shows that the two groups of ﬁrms incurred similar capital expenditures
in the matching year. While sample ﬁrms had statistically signiﬁcant lower return on assets [ROA:
Operating Income After Depreciation (OIADP)/Beginning-of-the-year Assets (AT)], the diﬀerence is not eco-
nomically signiﬁcant.13 The mean diﬀerence in ROA is approximately 2%, and the median diﬀerence is 1%.
Importantly, similarity in levels of capital expenditures and market to book ratio indicate that both groups
of ﬁrms had similar investment opportunity sets.
Table 2 Panel B provides descriptive statistics on sample and control ﬁrms for the three years before the
discontinuation year. The aggregate capital expenditure is not statistically diﬀerent for the two groups, sug-
gesting that sample and control ﬁrms had similar levels of investment ﬁrms leading up to the discontinuation.
The return on assets for the sample ﬁrms continues to be lower than the control group. This table also shows
that the average CSCORE in the three prior years is higher for sample ﬁrms than for the control ﬁrms, sug-
gesting that the discontinuation ﬁrms on average had more eﬀective prior timely-loss-reporting governance.
Table 2 Panel C provides descriptive statistics on the two groups of ﬁrms in the pre-discontinuation year.
As in the preceding years, there continues to be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the capital expenditures of
sample and control ﬁrms, but the proﬁtability gap widens signiﬁcantly. The mean diﬀerence in ROA reaches
approximately 6%. The mean ROA for sample ﬁrms becomes negative. Moreover, their cash balance
(industry- and year-adjusted cash balance [CHE] inverse quartile rank) becomes signiﬁcantly lower, which
could drive managers’ decisions to close unproﬁtable project in the following year. In other words, cash deﬁ-
ciency could act as an alternate governance mechanism (Jensen, 1986). Thus, based on evidence so far, it is
unclear whether the project closures that sample ﬁrms would announce in the following year are timely or late.12 Accounting regulations APB 30, SFAS 121, and SFAS 144 governed reporting of gains/losses from discontinued operations during our
study period. APB 30 required reporting of losses related to a “segment of a business”, including a separate line of business or a separate
class of customer. While APB 30 required reporting of estimates of expected disposal losses from discontinued divisions, it did not require
ﬁrms to report impairment losses of assets they did not plan to dispose of. SFAS 121 established accounting standards for the impairment
of long-lived assets and required ﬁrms to recognize an impairment loss if the carrying amount of the asset exceeds the undiscounted sum of
the expected future cash ﬂows. SFAS 144 consolidated provisions of APB 30 and SFAS 121 and expanded the deﬁnition of asset groups
under APB 30 to include any segment, unit, subsidiary, or asset group whose cash ﬂows can be identiﬁed separately.
13 Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), Zucca and Campbell (1992), and Heﬂin and Warﬁeld (1997) ﬁnd that asset
write-down ﬁrms underperform their industry peers.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Firm demographics in $ M Mean Q1 Median Q3
Control Sample Diﬀerence Control Sample Control Sample Control Sample
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for sample and control ﬁrms in the match year (four years before sample ﬁrms report discontinuations)
Total Assets 2062 2512 450 46 53 171 199 782 1021
Revenue 1664 2061 397** 54 63 209 238 869 1075
Market Value of Equity 2350 2156 194 31 34 137 153 741 829
Net Income 80 74 6 1 1 8 7 40 42
Capital Expenditure 139 161 22 2 2 10 11 48 63
Capital expenditure to lagged assets ratio 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11
Asset turnover ratio 1.36 1.32 0.04 0.77 0.76 1.20 1.19 1.69 1.65
ROE 0.09 0.07 0.02*** 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.16
ROA 0.06 0.04 0.02*** 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.09
Market to Book 2.39 2.38 0.01 0.97 0.93 1.63 1.53 2.72 2.53
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for sample and control ﬁrms in the three years before sample ﬁrms report discontinuations
Aggregate capital expenditure to lagged
assets
0.082 0.076 0.006 0.036 0.035 0.062 0.060 0.104 0.096
Average ROA 0.059 0.037 0.022*** 0.028 0.013 0.058 0.043 0.096 0.076
Aggregate CSCORE (Loss coeﬃcient) 0.139 0.151 0.012*** 0.087 0.095 0.133 0.143 0.184 0.200
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for sample and control ﬁrms in the year before sample ﬁrms report discontinuations
Total Assets 2624 3328 704* 65 76 246 280 1109 1423
Revenue 2260 2767 507* 77 90 297 328 1165 1478
Market Value of Equity 2926 2690 236 42 38 190 173 1014 933
Net Income 145 127 18 2 0 10 7 55 52
Aggregate capital expenditure to lagged
assets ratio
0.08 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.09
Asset Turnover 1.56 1.50 0.06 0.76 0.78 1.17 1.19 1.66 1.65
ROE 0.08 0.20 0.28 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.14
ROA 0.05 0.01 0.06* 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07
Market to Book 2.18 3.55 1.37 0.96 0.86 1.55 1.37 2.57 2.24
Industry and year adjusted cash-deﬁciency
quartile rank
2.47 2.60 0.13*** 2 2 2 3 3 3
Mean Q1 Median Q3
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for sample ﬁrms in discontinuation years
Gains/Losses from discontinued operations in $ M 0.23 6.84 0.81 2.15
Absolute value of Gains/Losses from discontinued operations as % of lagged assets 4.42% 0.52% 1.56% 4.57%
Gains/Losses from discontinued operations as % of lagged assets 0.78% 2.68% 0.52% 0.54%
Percent of ﬁrms that announce late discontinuations 40.9%
* Signiﬁcant at p-level of 0.10.
** Signiﬁcant at p-level of 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcant at p-level of 0.01.
156 A. Srivastava et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 147–167Table 2 Panel D provides descriptive statistics of gains/losses on discontinued operations for sample ﬁrms.
The mean unsigned eﬀect of discontinuation event on income amounts to 4.4% of beginning-of-the-year assets
and the median is 1.5%, indicating a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrm’s reported assets and income. The mean signed
eﬀect is 0.78% and the median is 0.52%. About 40% of the sample ﬁrms announce late discontinuations
(that is, report discontinuation losses greater than 1%).
3.4. Testing Hypothesis H1
To investigate determinants of project discontinuations, we use a multivariate logistic regression
model to explain the ﬁrm’s membership in the treatment versus control groups. We use the following
equation:
Table
Projec
higher
Variab
Interce
CSCO
Marke
LogSiz
CashD
Proﬁta
Contro
N
Model
Probab
Percen
Pseudo
* Dic
** On
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X3
i¼1
CSCOREti þ b3 MarketToBookt1
þ b4  LogSizet1 þ b5  CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1
þ b6 
X3
i¼1
ROAti þ b7  Dummy APB30 yeart
þ b8  Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b9  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et; ð1ÞWe code DiscontinuedOp as 1 if the ﬁrm reports a discontinued operation in year t and zero otherwise. The
coeﬃcient of interest is b2, the coeﬃcient on aggregate CSCORE in the three years prior to discontinuation
year. We expect ﬁrms that report discontinuations to have higher CSCORE than other ﬁrms, so we expect
b2 to be positive. We control for factors that might aﬀect the likelihood of project discontinuation, in partic-
ular, the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities set (proxied by market to book ratio) and ﬁrm size (natural log of
ﬁrm’s assets). We also control for cash deﬁciency because it could aﬀect discontinuation decisions for two rea-
sons. First, a cash surplus ﬁrm can forego external funding for its projects and thereby avoid the increased
monitoring from external fund providers. Second, a cash-deﬁcient ﬁrm is more likely to shelve unproﬁtable
projects to conserve resources. We also control for ﬁrm performance in the three prior years because high
overall proﬁtability could reduce pressure on ﬁrms to terminate unproﬁtable operations. Finally, we control
for the ﬁxed eﬀects of applicable accounting regulation (APB 30 (1973), SAFS 121, and SFAS 144) that could
aﬀect the reporting of discontinued operations (as shown in Fig. 2).3.5. Results for Hypothesis H1
We present results in Table 3. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on prior aggregate CSCORE is positive.
Consistent with Hypothesis H1, this shows that on average, eﬀective timely-loss-recognition governance3
t discontinuations and prior timeliness of loss recognition. Panel A: Test to examine whether discontinuations are associated with
CSCORE (dichotomous logistic regression model).*
LogLikelihoodt ¼ b1 þ b2 
X3
i¼1
CSCOREti=3þ b3 MarketToBookt1 þ b4  LogSizet1 þ b5 CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1
þ b6 
X3
i¼1
ROAti=3þ b7 Dummy APB30 yeart þ b8 Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b9 Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et:
le Predicted sign Model 1
Estimate p-value**
pt 1 0.440 0.006
RE 1.969 <0.001
tToBook ? 0.059 <0.001
e ? 0.110 <0.001
eﬁciencyQuartileRank + 0.077 0.009
bility  4.259 <0.001
ls for ﬁxed-eﬀects for APB 30, SFAS 121, and SFAS 144 Yes
7202
chi-square 244.1
ility <0.001
t Concordant 60.8%
R-squared 0.044
hotomous dependent variable that equals one for ﬁrms that report discontinuations and zero for matched control ﬁrms.
e-tailed test for directional hypotheses.
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suggests that ﬁrms with smaller investment opportunities are more likely to discontinue projects. The coeﬃ-
cient on the cash deﬁciency variable is positive, which suggests that cash-deﬁcient ﬁrms are more likely to close
projects.
3.6. Testing Hypothesis H2
The dichotomous logistic model described above treats all late discontinuations as having equal severity. As
we note above, some of the reported discontinuations could potentially represent timely closures, while the
others represent late closures. We expect timely closures to be associated with more eﬀective
timely-loss-recognition governance than late closures. The more timely a ﬁrm’s loss recognition, the smaller
the loss on discontinued operations should be. We ﬁrst examine this conjecture by estimating the relation
between the loss on discontinued operations and CSCORE while controlling for other determinants of discon-
tinued operations and the related losses. The model isLossOnDiscontinuationt ¼ b1 þ b2 
X3
i¼1
CSCOREti þ b3 MarketToBookt1
þ b4  LogSizet1 þ b5  CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1
þ b6 
X3
i¼1
ROAti þ b7  Dummy APB30 yeart
þ b8  Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b9  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et; ð2Þ
where LossOnDiscontinuation is the loss on discontinued operations deﬂated by beginning of year assets.
We eliminate observations with gains on discontinued operations and only estimate model (2) on ﬁrms with
losses on discontinued operation – a sample comprised of 2278 observations. We expect the coeﬃcient of
CSCORE, b2, to be negative, reﬂecting a negative relation between conservatism and losses on discontinued
operations.
Next, we estimate two logistic model speciﬁcations on the entire sample of discontinued-operations ﬁrms.
The logistic regression model isLogLikelihoodðLateDiscontinuationÞt ¼ b1 þ b2 
X3
i¼1
CSCOREti þ b3 MarketToBookt1
þ b4  LogSizet1 þ b5  CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1
þ b6 
X3
i¼1
ROAti þ b7  Dummy APB30 yeart
þ b8  Dummy SFAS121 yeart
þ b9  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et: ð3ÞIn the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we use a dichotomous dependent variable that takes the value of one for late clo-
sures and zero for timely closures. We classify ﬁrms with losses on discontinuation smaller than 1% of
beginning-of-the-year assets and ﬁrms with gains on discontinuation as timely discontinuations and other
ﬁrms as late discontinuations. In the second speciﬁcation, we use an ordered dependent variable that incorpo-
rates discontinuation severity and takes a value of three for ﬁrms that report extremely late discontinuations
(losses on discontinuation exceed 5% of beginning-of-the-year assets), two for very late discontinuation (losses
on discontinuation exceed 3% but are below 5% of beginning-of-the-year assets), one for ﬁrms that report late
discontinuations (losses are 1–3% of beginning-of-year assets) and zero for ﬁrms that report timely discontin-
uations (the remaining ﬁrms). In both speciﬁcations, b2 measures the eﬀect of CSCORE on the likelihood of
late discontinuations. We expect b2 to be negative.
Table 4
Severity of project discontinuations and prior timeliness of loss recognition. Tests to examine whether late discontinuations are associated with lower CSCORE. Model 1: OLS
regression model using data of only discontinuation ﬁrms that declared losses on discontinuation.*
LossOnDiscontinuationt ¼ b1 þ b2 
X3
i¼1
CSCOREti=3þ b3 MarketToBookt1 þ b4  LogSizet1 þ b5  CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1 þ b6 
X3
i¼1
ROAti=3þ b7
 Dummy APB30 yeart þ b8  Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b9  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et
Model 2: Dichotomous logistic regression model 2 using data of only discontinuation ﬁrms.** Model 3: Ordered logistic regression model 2 using data of only discontinuation ﬁrms.***
LogLikelihoodt ¼ b1 þ b2 
X3
i¼1
CSCOREti=3þ b3 MarketToBookt1 þ b4  LogSizet1 þ b5  CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1 þ b6 
X3
i¼1
ROAti=3þ b7  Dummy APB30 yeart
þ b8  Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b9  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et:
Variable Predicted sign Model 1 Predicted sign Model 2 Model 3
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept 1 0.046 <0.001 0.539 0.022 0.830 0.002
Intercept 2 0.315 0.162
Intercept 3 0.582 0.009
CSCORE  0.036 0.003  1.991 0.001 2.05 <0.001
MarketToBook ? 0.003 <0.001 ? 0.012 0.573 0.031 0.135
LogSize ? 0.005 <0.001 ? 0.235 <0.001 0.245 <0.001
CashDeﬁciencyQuartileRank ? 0.001 0.251 + 0.107 0.004 0.089 0.007
Proﬁtability ? 0.117 <0.001 ? 2.030 <0.001 2.771 <0.001
Controls for ﬁxed-eﬀects for APB 30, SFAS 121, and SFAS 144 Yes Yes Yes
N 2278 3601 3601
F Value 37.3
Model chi-square 240.1 285.6
Probability <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Percent Concordant 64.9% 63.8%
Adj/Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.087 0.086
* Model 1 is an OLS regression. LossOnDiscontinuation is the discontinuation loss deﬂated by beginning-of-the-year assets.
** Model 2 is a logistic regression with an dichotomous dependent variable that equals one for ﬁrms that report late discontinuations (losses on discontinuation exceed 1% of
beginning-of-the-year assets, N = 1474) and zero for ﬁrms that report timely discontinuations (losses on discontinuation are below 1% of beginning-of-the-year assets, N = 2127).
*** Model 3 is a logistic regression with an ordered dependent variable that equals three for ﬁrms that report extremely late discontinuations (losses on discontinuation exceed 5% of
beginning-of-the-year assets, N = 560), very late discontinuations (losses on discontinuation exceed 3% but are below 5% of beginning-of-the-year assets, N = 267), one for ﬁrms that
report late discontinuations (losses on discontinuation exceed 1% but are below 3% of beginning-of-the-year assets, N = 647), and zero for ﬁrms that report timely discontinuations
(losses on discontinuation are below 1% of beginning-of-the-year assets, N = 2127).
 One-tailed test for directional hypotheses.
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We present results for Eqs. (2) and (3) in Table 4. The ﬁrst column shows the results of estimating Eq. (2).
The negative coeﬃcient on CSCORE (b2) suggests that the losses on discontinuations decrease with
timely-loss-recognition governance. In other words, timelier reporting of losses reduces the likelihood of late
discontinuations.
The second and third columns of Table 3 present results of the two speciﬁcations of Eq. (3). The coeﬃcient
on aggregate CSCORE (b2) is negative, which suggests that as CSCORE increases, the likelihood of late, very
late, and extremely late closures declines. These results taken together with results for Hypothesis 1 suggest
that timely loss recognition increases the likelihood of discontinuations of unproﬁtable projects and also
increases the likelihood that such projects are discontinued in a timely manner.3.8. Testing Hypothesis H3
In this hypothesis, we examine the economic consequences to the ﬁrm of reporting late discontinuations.
Fig. 1b illustrates our research design. We expect late discontinuation ﬁrms to improve the timeliness of loss
reporting and reduce capital expenditures in the following years.
We test these two conjectures using the following regressions:ChangeCSCOREðtþ2;tþ1Þðt1;t2Þ ¼ b1 þ b2  DummyDiscontinuationt þ b3  DummyLateDiscontinuationt
þ b4 MarketToBookt1 þ b5  LogSizet1 þ b6
 CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1 þ b7  Dummy APB30 yeart
þ b8  Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b9  Dummy SFAS144 yeart
þ et; ð4ÞandChangeCAPEX ðtþ2;tþ1Þðt1;t2Þ ¼ b1 þ b2  DummyDiscontinuationt þ b3  DummyLateDiscontinuationt
þ b4 MarketToBookt1 þ b5  LogSizet1 þ b6
 CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1 þ b7  Dummy APB30 yeart þ b8
 Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b9  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et; ð5Þwhere the dependent variable in Eq. (4) is the change in CSCORE from the two years prior to the two years
after the discontinuation years. In Eq. (5), the dependent variable is the change in capital expenditure over the
same period. To test H3, we use sample and control ﬁrm matched pairs with data for all four years.
In Eq. (4), the coeﬃcient on DummyDiscontinuation (b2) measures the changes in CSCOREs of
timely-closure ﬁrms, while that on DummyLateDiscontinuation (b3) measures the changes in CSCOREs of late
closure ﬁrms. We do not expect principals of timely closure ﬁrms to demand changes in conservatism, so we
expect b2 to be zero. However, we expect principals of late closure ﬁrms to demand improvement in CSCORE,
and we therefore expect the coeﬃcient on DummyLateDiscontinuation (b3) to be positive.
Similarly, in Eq. (4), the coeﬃcient on DummyDiscontinuation (b2) measures the changes in capital expen-
ditures of timely closure ﬁrms. We do not expect principals of timely closure ﬁrms to constrain capital expen-
ditures, so we expect b2 to be zero. On the other hand; we expect principals of late closure ﬁrms to constrain
further capital expenditures; therefore, we expect a negative coeﬃcient on DummyLateDiscontinuation (b3).3.9. Results for Hypothesis H3
In column 1 of Table 5, we present results for Eq. (4). The coeﬃcient on DummyDiscontinuation (b2) is not
diﬀerent from zero, which suggests that principals do not demand changes in timely-loss-recognition gover-
nance for ﬁrms that promptly close unproﬁtable projects. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient on
Table 5
Economic consequences of late discontinuations.Model 1: Shareholders of ﬁrms that report late discontinuations demand improvement in
CSCORE.*
ChangeCSCOREðtþ2;tþ1Þðt1;t2Þ ¼ b2  DummyDiscontinuationt þ b3  DummyLateDiscontinuationt þ b4 MarketToBookt1
þ b5  LogSizet1 þ b6  CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1 þ b8  Dummy APB30 yeart
þ b9  Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b10  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et
Model 2: Shareholders of ﬁrms that report late discontinuation constrain capital expenditure.*
ChangeCAPEX ðtþ2;tþ1Þðt1;t2Þ ¼ b2  DummyDiscontinuationt þ b3  DummyLateDiscontinuationt þ b4 MarketToBookt1
þ b5  LogSizet1 þ b6  CashDeficiencyQuartileRankt1 þ b8  Dummy APB30 yeart
þ b9  Dummy SFAS121 yeart þ b10  Dummy SFAS144 yeart þ et:
Variable Predicted sign Model 1 Predicted sign Model 2
Estimate p-value** Estimate p-value**
Intercept 1 0.271 <0.001 0.044 <0.001
DummyDiscontinuation ? 0.005 0.605 ? 0.004 0.319
DummyLateDiscontinuation + 0.029 0.015  0.024 <0.001
MarketToBook ? 0.284 <0.001 ? 0.002 0.043
LogSize ? 0.001 0.563 ? 0.005 <0.001
CashDeﬁciencyQuartileRank ? 0.003 0.500 ? 0.020 <0.001
Controls for ﬁxed-eﬀects for APB 30, SFAS 121,
and SFAS 144
Yes Yes
N 4222 4222
F Value 69.4 14.4
Probability <0.001 <0.001
Adj R-squared 0.115 0.025
* Models use OLS regression. DummyLateDiscontinuations equals one if losses on discontinuation exceed 1% of beginning-of-the-year
assets and zero otherwise; DummyDiscontinuations equals one for ﬁrms that report losses on discontinuation, which are below 1% of
beginning-of-the-year assets and zero otherwise. The number of observations is smaller than the earlier ﬁrms because it includes only those
sample and corresponding control ﬁrms for which data also are available two years after sample ﬁrms announce discontinuations.
** One-tailed test for directional hypotheses.
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liness of loss recognition, responding to principals’ demands.
The results of Eq. (5), presented in column 2 of Table 5, show that there is no change in capital expenditures
of ﬁrms that shelve projects in a timely manner; however, there is a signiﬁcant decline in capital expenditure of
ﬁrms that report late discontinuations.
3.10. Results of tests using the conservatism ratio
In this section, we report the results of tests using an alternate measure of the timeliness of the recognition
of economic news in accounting earnings, the Conservatism Ratio (Callen et al., 2010). This measure is based
on the idea that current earnings, market returns, and the book-to-market ratio all contain information about
future earnings and returns (the expected components). Accordingly, in this model, expected earnings and
returns are obtained from the current year’s variables using a system of equations that assumes a
ﬁrst-order vector autoregressive process. The unexpected component of earnings, the earnings news, is mea-
sured as actual accounting earnings minus expected earnings. Similarly, returns are decomposed into the
expected and unexpected portions, with the latter further decomposed into the earnings shock (i.e., the true
economic news) and the shock to the discount rate (Vuolteenaho, 2002). The Conservatism Ratio (CR) is
deﬁned as the ratio of earnings news to earnings shock that measures the extent to which accounting earnings
incorporate economic news in a timely manner.
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greater than $ 10 million and Compustat data on special items (“SPI”) for 1968 to 2007. We retain ﬁrms with
data on current and lagged returns, earnings and the book to market ratio, and eliminate observations with
extreme values of each of these variables (based on 1st and 99th percentiles). Our sample univariate statistics
and the parameters in the variance–covariance matrix (obtained from an intermediate step in calculating CR)
are similar to those reported by Callen et al. (2010). We derive ﬁrm-speciﬁc unexpected earnings from expected
earning models estimated by Fama–French industry groups and use the unexpected earnings to estimate CR
for each ﬁrm-year. Similar to Callen et al. (2010), we retain ﬁrm years with positive CR, which leaves us with a
sample of 74,584 observations. Next, we retain ﬁrms that report discontinuations and have data to estimate
CR for all three years prior to the discontinuation year. We construct a control sample of ﬁrms that report no
discontinuations using the matching procedure described in Section 3. This leaves us with a matched-pair sam-
ple of 997 ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that the average CR in the three years preceding the discontinuation is not statistically diﬀerent for
the sample and control ﬁrms. Nevertheless, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the tests on the relation between earn-
ings timeliness and the magnitude of discontinuation losses reported in Table 4 when we use CR in place of
CSCORE. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that among ﬁrms that report discontinuations losses, the magnitude of losses
decreases with the level of CR. Moreover, CR is negatively associated with the likelihood that a ﬁrm reports
late discontinuations. This provides additional support for our hypothesis that the prompt reporting of eco-
nomic news in accounting earning reduces the likelihood that managers continue unproﬁtable projects.4. Supplementary tests to examine validity of DO measure
In this section, we examine the validity of our empirical measure of “economic losses” on project discon-
tinuations: “Net Income (loss) from discontinued operations” in Compustat. This variable includes both the
operating losses of the discontinued division and the capital losses on its disposal, and is stated on an after-tax
basis. Both those losses are components of our intended construct of unproﬁtability of discontinued opera-
tions – the ﬁrst loss represents the current operating losses and the second reﬂects the present value of future
operating losses (adjusted for holding costs of disposed assets).
The “DO”measure is subject to three potential limitations. First, “DO”may not accurately represent either
the accounting information or the construct of unproﬁtability of discontinued operations that we set out to
examine. Second, “Net Income (loss) from discontinued operations” is likely to contain operating losses of
the discontinued division for only a part of the year, and this might reduce its comparability across ﬁrms.
Third, we deﬂate “DO” by the total assets of the ﬁrm and use that ratio for our main tests. While this ratio
measures the economic signiﬁcance of discontinuation for the ﬁrm, it might not accurately reﬂect the ROA of
the discontinued operations that should ideally be based on the book value of its assets.
In order to address those potential concerns and to test the statistical and construct validity of our
total-assets deﬂated “DO” measure, we hand collect data from ﬁrms’ 10-K ﬁlings. To economize on hand col-
lection costs, we shortlist S&P 1500 ﬁrms with total assets greater than $ 1000M. Then, we retain observations
consistent with SFAS 121 and SFAS 144 accounting regimes (but not with APB 18 regime), which leaves us
with 431 observations. Of those observations, we could obtain data on operating losses of discontinued oper-
ations and their asset values (either value of assets held for sale or asset values of discontinued operations) for
238 observations, which we use to calculate return on assets (ROA) of the discontinued operations in the
pre-disclosure year. We found data on disposal gains (losses) for 142 observations.
First, we test the statistical validity of data ﬁeld “DO” in the Compustat database. “DO” matches the
hand-collected data on a dollar-to-dollar basis for 97% of the 238 observations described above. This 97%
matching is made up of matches with operating losses (59%) and matches with the sum of operating and dis-
posal losses (38%). These tests establish the statistical validity of the “DO” measure.
Next, we examine the construct validity of total-assets deﬂated “DO” measure that we use for our main
tests. We ﬁnd that the ROA of the discontinued division in the year prior to the discontinuation year is highly
correlated with DO deﬂated by total assets: The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is 0.24, and the Spearman14 We are grateful to the authors of Callen et al. (2010) for sharing the SAS programming code for calculating CR.
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are highly correlated with DO deﬂated by total assets: The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is 0.57, and the
Spearman correlation is 0.82, both signiﬁcant at p-level better than 0.01. Those tests establish the construct
validity of “DO” measure.
Next, we test whether the two components of “DO” are correlated, which would suggest that we would
obtain consistent results using DO or either of its components. We ﬁnd that the ROA of discontinued oper-
ations in the year before the discontinuation year is highly correlated with the deﬂated disposal losses, both
calculated using book value of discontinued assets: The Pearson (Spearman Rank) correlation coeﬃcient is
0.42 (0.50), both signiﬁcant at p-level better than 0.01.
Many ﬁrms discontinue proﬁtable operations, which is apparently contrary to our conjecture that ﬁrms
only close unproﬁtable operations. However, ﬁrms may close proﬁtable operations that do not earn the cost
of capital or meet the ﬁrms’ internal hurdle rate of return. We test that conjecture next. We calculate the dif-
ference between the ROA of the rest-of-the-ﬁrm (i.e., without the discontinued division) and the ROA of the
discontinued division in the year before the discontinuation year. First, we ﬁnd that the average (median) dif-
ference in the two ROAs is 0.03 (0.02) indicating that ﬁrms discontinue projects with proﬁtability lower than
the rest of their operations. Moreover, as we expect, both deﬂated disposal values and our empirical measure
(that is, the total-asset-deﬂated “DO” measure) are negatively associated with the diﬀerence of ROAs. The
Pearson (Spearman Rank) correlation coeﬃcients are 0.40 (0.44) and 0.22 (0.42), all signiﬁcant at
p-level better than 0.01. In other words, the lower the proﬁtability of discontinued operations relative to that
of the rest of the ﬁrm, the lower the disposal proceeds, and the more negative the total-asset-deﬂated “DO”
measure.
5. Conclusion
In the normal course of business, ﬁrms undertake capital projects, some of which later turn out to be
unproﬁtable. Managers receive information about expected cash ﬂows from those unproﬁtable projects earlier
than the principals. Managers can limit ﬁrms’ economic losses by closing unproﬁtable projects in a timely
manner. However, managers may continue to operate unproﬁtable projects to build “empires”, to protect
their performance-based bonuses, and to avoid signaling bad performance to retain their employment.
Prior studies argue that prompt loss recognition can reduce such agency costs by improving monitoring of
managers and by reducing incentives for managers to delay closures of unproﬁtable projects. However, no
prior study has empirically examined this notion. Francis and Martin (2010) ﬁnd that prompt loss recognition
is associated with more proﬁtable acquisition strategies and more prompt post-acquisition divestitures of
unproﬁtable investments. We extend their study by examining whether timely loss recognition is associated
with timely closures of unproﬁtable projects.
We use ﬁrms’ reporting of discontinued operations as a proxy for the termination of unproﬁtable projects.
We form a control group of ﬁrms that did not report any discontinuations, but belong to same industries as
discontinuation ﬁrms and have similar size. We assume that industry- and size-matched control ﬁrms have
similar investment opportunities and face similar economic shocks as discontinuation ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that in
the three years prior to reporting discontinuations, sample ﬁrms have timelier loss recognition than the control
ﬁrms. Moreover, ﬁrms that announce large discontinuation losses have less eﬀective timely-loss-recognition
governance than the other ﬁrms.
We argue that after ﬁrms announce late discontinuations, principals would demand improved timeliness of
loss recognition. As expected, the inter-temporal change in CSCORE is greater for late discontinuation ﬁrms
than for the other ﬁrms in the same period. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that the managers of late discontin-
uation ﬁrms are restrained from implementing further capital expenditure projects.
Our study provides empirical support for the notion that prompt loss recognition reduces agency costs by
improving board of directors’, lenders’, and shareholders’ monitoring of managers’ investment activities. We
extend Francis and Martin (2010) by providing empirical evidence that prompt loss recognition provides alter-
nate corporate governance mechanism for checking managers’ tendency to continue implementing unprof-
itable projects.
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A.1. Loss-term coeﬃcient in CSCORE (Khan and Watts, 2009)
Basu’s equation for measuring conservatism is as follows:X it ¼ b1 þ b2  Dit þ b3  Rit þ b4  Dit  Rit þ ei;t; ðA1Þwhere X is the annual earnings and R is the returns during the year. D takes a value of 0 if ﬁrms have positive
returns and 1 if ﬁrms have negative returns. Eﬀectively, b4 measures the diﬀerential timeliness of recognition of
economic loss in accounting earnings relative to that of economic gains.
Khan and Watts (2009) modify the measure using the following equation:X it ¼ b1t þ b2t  Dit þ b3t  Rit  ðl1 þ l2  Sizeit þ l3 M=Bit þ l4  LevitÞ þ b4t  Dit  Rit
 ðk1 þ k2  Sizeit þ k3 M=Bit þ k4  LevitÞ þ b5t  ðm2  Sizeit þ m3 M=Bit þ m4  LevitÞ
þ b6t  Dit  ðx1 þ x2  Sizeit þ x3 M=Bit þ x4  LevitÞ þ eit; ðA2Þwhere Size is the natural log of market value, M/B is the market to book ratio, and Lev is the leverage of the
ﬁrm.
In Eq. (A2), the terms that are multiplied by D (the second, fourth, and sixth terms) are zero for gains
observations (ﬁrms whose returns are positive). Because we focus on cross-sectional variation in the timeliness
of loss recognition, we exclude the gain term and estimate the following equation on ﬁrms with negative
returns.X it ¼ b1t þ b2t  Rit  ðl1 þ l2  Sizeit þ l3 M=Bit þ l4  LevitÞ þ b3t  ðm2  Sizeit þ m3
M=Bit þ m4  LevitÞ þ eit: ðA3ÞWe exclude ﬁnance ﬁrms and ﬁrms with share prices less than $ 1, and we calculate regression parameters
separately for each year (a1t, a2t, a3t, a4t, and a5t) using Eq. (A4).X it ¼ a1t þ a2t  Rit þ a3t  Sizeit  Rit þ a4t M=Bit  Rit þ a5t  Levit  Rit þ a6t  Sizeit þ a7t
M=Bit þ a8t  Levit þ eit: ðA4ÞThen we calculate CSCORE (loss recognition) for each ﬁrm year using coeﬃcients estimated for that year
as follows:CSCOREi;tðloss recognitionÞ ¼ ~a2t þ ~a3t  Sizeit þ ~a4t M=Bit þ ~a5t  Levit: ðA5Þ
We deﬁne variables similar to Khan and Watts (2009) as follows (data items in Compustat):Earnings Earnings per share (EPSFX) divided by beginning price (PRCC_F)
Returns [change in price + dividends (DVPSX)]/beginning price. The variables are adjusted for stock splits
using adjustment factor (AJEX)
M/B Market value of equity [Price  Number of shares outstanding (CSHO)]/book value of equity
(CEQ)
Size Natural log of market value of equity
Leverage Total Debt [Long term debt (DLTT) + debt in current liability (DLC)]/Market value of equityAll variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile by year.
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(obtained by adding coeﬃcient on gains term and loss interaction terms in Table 3).Our calculations Khan and Watts (2009)Mean across years Median across yearsFirst term ~a2;t 0.232 0.233 0.268
Size term ~a3;t 0.024 0.024 0.028
Market to book term ~a4;t 0.009 0.006 0.013 (NS)
Leverage term ~a5;t 0.069 0.066 0.038Following is the comparison of CSCORE (for loss observations) with those reported by Khan and Watts
(2009) (obtained by adding coeﬃcient on CSCORE and GSCORE in Table 4 Panel A).Our calculations Khan and Watts (2009)Mean MedianCSCORE (for loss observations) 0.157 0.139 0.153The slight diﬀerences from the Khan and Watts (2009) estimates are likely for the following reasons:
1. Unlike Khan and Watts (2009), we exclude ﬁnance ﬁrms (SIC Codes 6000 to 6999) from our analysis.
2. Unlike Khan and Watts (2009), we winsorize our data at 1st and 99th percentile by year.
3. Khan and Watts (2009) measure ﬁscal year returns over 12 months beginning in the month after the earn-
ings announcement. We measure ﬁscal year returns over the ﬁscal year.
4. Our measurement period is 1972 to 2007 as against 1963 to 2005 in Khan and Watts (2009).
Appendix B. Deﬁnitions of variablesDiscontinuations When ﬁrms report non-zero gains and losses from discontinued operations (DO)
DummyDiscontinuation Takes value one in the years in which ﬁrms announce a discontinuation and zero
otherwise
Late discontinuations When ﬁrms report losses from discontinued operations exceeding 1% of
beginning-of-the-year assets (AT)
DummyLateDiscontinuation Takes value one in the years in which ﬁrms announce a late discontinuation with
large losses and zero otherwise
Sample ﬁrms Firms that report discontinuations, but do not report discontinuations in the
previous three years
Control ﬁrms Firms that belong to the same industry as sample ﬁrms (have same 3-digit or
2-digit SIC code), are closest in asset size to sample ﬁrms four years prior to
their reported discontinuations, and do not report any discontinuationsAssets Total assets (AT)
Revenue Revenue (SALE)
Market value Market value of equity [Price (PRCCF)  Number of shares outstanding
(CSHO)]
Net income Income before extraordinary items (IB)
Capital Expenditure Capital expenditure (CAPX)
Market to book ratio Market value of equity/book value of equity (CEQ)
Line missing
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RankInverse quartile rank of cash balance (CHE) by industry (3-digit SIC code) and
yearLogSize Natural log of market value of equity
Deﬂated Capital
ExpenditureCapital Expenditure (CAPX)/beginning-of-the-year assets (AT)Funds raised Funds raised [debt issued (DLTIS) + Equity issued
(SSTK)]/beginning-of-the-year assetsROE Income before extraordinary items (IB)/book value of equity (CEQ)
ROA Operating Income After Depreciation (OIADP)/Beginning-of-the-year Assets
(AT)
Asset Turnover Revenue/Assets
Dummy_APB30_year Takes value one if discontinuation year falls between 1973 and 1996 and zero
otherwise
Dummy_SFAS121_year Takes value one if discontinuation year falls between 1997 and 2001 and zero
otherwise
Dummy_SFAS144_year Takes value one if discontinuation year is after 2001 and zero otherwiseAll variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.References
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